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CONSUMER LAW AS TAX ALTERNATIVE
RORY VAN LOO**
Policymakers and scholars have in distributional conversations
traditionally ignored consumer laws, defined as the set of consumer
protection, antitrust, and entry barrier laws that govern consumer
transactions. Tax law dominates distributional conversations partly
because legal rules are seen as less efficient and partly because
consumer law research speaks to narrow and siloed contexts—
deceptive fees by Visa or a proposed merger between Comcast and
Time Warner Cable. Even millions of dollars in reduced credit card
fees seem trivial compared to the trillion-dollar growth in income
inequality that has sparked concern in recent decades. This Article is
the first to synthesize the fragmented empirical literature quantifying
inefficiently higher consumer prices across diverse markets—called
overcharge. If economists’ overcharge empirics are to be believed,
the current legal framework allows businesses to overcharge
consumers well over a trillion dollars, or approximately ten percent
of all that consumers spend. The data available also suggests that
low- and middle-income consumers likely disproportionately pay
overcharge. Moreover, reducing consumer overcharge could bring
the share of income earned by the top one percent of households
from its current level—twenty percent of all income—to about where
it was in 1980, when the top one percent earned ten percent of all
income. Moreover, this massive redistribution would be driven by
laws making markets more competitive, rather than tax increases
that distort markets. And they would hit two types of inequality—on
the spending side, and on the income side. If the empirical literature
currently available is right, consumer law merits serious
consideration as an alternative to tax.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year, the tax system redistributes trillions of dollars. These
transfers have received heightened bipartisan attention in recent years,1
after the share of income earned by the top one percent of households
doubled between 1980 and 2010.2 Bipartisan leaders in academia, business,
civil society, and government have identified rising inequality as a leading
driver of societal risk,3 and scholars have linked it to lower economic
growth and political instability.4 The main policy debates have focused on
taxes,5 in accordance with the longstanding scholarly paradigm that taxes
are the best mechanism for redistribution because they are the most
efficient option.6

1. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Both Parties Agree the Opportunity Gap Is Widening, But the
Proposed Solutions Are Starkly Different, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2014, at A2 (reporting that “the
two parties point to the same economic currents—the growing income disparity between the
highest-earning Americans and everyone else”); Nelson D. Schwartz, Economists Take Aim at
Wealth
Inequality,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
3,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/business/economy/economists-take-aim-at-wealthinequality.html [https://perma.cc/2FBW-3U6D] (reporting that the annual meeting of the 2016
American Economic Association, “a barometer of what concerns economists most,” was filled
with presentations about inequality); 18th Annual Faculty Conference, FEDERALIST SOCIETY
(Jan.
8,
2016)
at
http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/18th-annual-faculty-conference
[https://perma.cc/GR97-NKQZ] (listing a panel on inequality as one of four topical sessions in
the annual faculty conference for the Federalist Society); American Constitution Society at Yale
Law School, Law & Inequality Conference; FACEBOOK (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/events/1476302866005591/
[https://perma.cc/Z99H-48ZZ]
(organizing a national conference).
2. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Table S8.2 (2014).
3. See, e.g., The Global Risks Report 2017, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 4, 6 (2017),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4296-NH2Y]
(surveying roughly 750 World Economic Forum stakeholders and reporting “rising income and
wealth disparity” as the leading trend driving risks
4. See STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, HOW INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY IS
DAMPENING U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO CHANGE THE TIDE, 1, 3 (2014)
(concluding that inequality hinders growth, partly because low- and middle-income consumers
spend a larger portion of what they earn); Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income
Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment, 40 EUROP. ECON. REV. 1203, 1204 (1996)
(finding that income inequality likely leads to socio-political instability). The causal relationships
between inequality and instability are complex and still in development. See, e.g., Ronald F.
Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and
Cultural Backlash 2 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Working Paper No. RWP16-026, 2016) (examining
inequality and contrasting theories that seek to explain the rise of anti-establishment populist
political movements).
5. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 471 (“[T]he ideal policy for avoiding an endless
inegalitarian spiral and regaining control over the dynamics of accumulation would be a
progressive global tax on capital.”); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Republican Discovery of the
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015, at A15 (discussing Republican proposals to address inequality
through tax reform).
6. See Chris William Sanchirico, Optimal Redistributional Instruments in Law and
Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME 1: METHODOLOGY
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This Article looks at an alternative mechanism for redistribution:
consumer overcharge. In an informal but intuitive sense, overcharge is the
difference between actual prices and prices that would exist absent some
act identified as anticompetitive—such as a monopolistic merger or
deceptive sales practice.7 The animating question of the Article is whether
efficiency-improving consumer laws might provide a superior alternative to
taxes for a substantial portion of redistribution. Framed as such, the inquiry
is relevant for those wanting to significantly lessen inequality. But it is also
relevant for those simply wishing to improve the efficiency of how we
achieve the current level of distribution.
Three main questions frame the analysis. First, might reducing
overcharge redistribute resources of a sufficient magnitude to put consumer
law in conversation with tax? Second, would the direction of that
redistribution meaningfully lessen inequality? Third, does consumer law
provide a sufficient institutional alternative to taxes?
To be clear, each of these questions is impossible to answer
definitively. But absolute certainty is not, and never has been, the standard
for law and economics. Indeed, scholars and policy makers regularly draw
conclusions under great uncertainty about the best means of redistribution.
Their default assumption is usually that consumer law is irrelevant or
inferior to tax—but that assumption is rarely interrogated in light of the
evidence available. My primary aim is to move such decisions from
impressionistic to empirically informed.
On the first question, the magnitude of overcharge, the literature has
yet to provide a sustained and empirically based examination. This gap is
problematic because policy making on distributional issues is dominated by
public finance and tax analyses. Those macroeconomic inquiries consider
how to transfer trillions of dollars.8 In contrast, those who quantify
consumer overcharge tend to analyze a small slice of the economy—how a
bank deceives consumers into paying a few dollars in additional credit card
fees, for example, or how a merger among bottlers leads to a price increase
of a few cents on each soft drink. It is not immediately clear to someone
with an instant tax lever for moving trillions of dollars of income around
how a few cents of overcharge per soft drink, or even billions of dollars
AND CONCEPTS 323 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (noting that in law and economics and in public
finance the belief that income taxation is superior to other redistributional instruments dominates
despite a countercurrent); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994)
(arguing that legal rules should seek to efficiently regulate, leaving distributional goals to the tax
system).
7. Perfectly competitive prices are at marginal cost, just high enough to motivate firms to
produce the equilibrium quantity and give firm owners a competitive return on investment.
8. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 5, at A15.
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rolled up in a given market, is worthy of attention. The observation that
“law and economics” should be renamed “law and microeconomics”9 is
particularly apt for consumer law.
To inform the question of magnitude, the Article synthesizes currently
disconnected empirical studies of overcharge. Legal scholars have begun
this exercise in subsets of consumer law, concluding that consumers pay
billions of dollars in higher prices due to market distortions related to
financial institution sales practices (such as deceptive credit card fees),10
retail goods sales practices,11 antitrust,12 common ownership of competing
firms,13 and occupational licensing.14 Though academics have necessarily
divided up the study of these areas for greater precision, a consumer may
pay overcharge for each of these categories of overcharge on a single
purchase, such as for an automobile. Moreover, a single governmental
entity, most notably the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), can act on the
laws driving the three major categories of overcharge—entry restriction,
antitrust and consumer protection.15 Making conservative assumptions
based on the dispersed literature would put consumer overcharge across the

9. Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/02/law-and-macroeconomics
[https://perma.cc/D67K-H2UR].
10. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64
(2008) (arguing that “unsafe credit products reduce the overall amount of resources in a society”).
11. See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2015) (discussing behavioral economics overcharge by sellers of
goods such as Amazon, Walmart, Unilever, and Kraft).
12. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,
104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2015) (explaining how changes to antitrust laws could lessen income
inequality); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 237 (2017) (“A revived
antitrust movement could play an important role in reversing the dramatic rise in economic
inequality.”);
13. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016)
(concluding that horizontal shareholding is widespread in the U.S. economy and helps explain the
steep increase in income inequality)
14. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of
Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S195–96 (2013) (noting
that, unlike unionized jobs, professions that require licensing as a barrier to entry have not shown
to reduce wage inequality). Not only are these analyses disconnected, but also similar analyses
have yet to be undertaken for significant areas of overcharge, particularly related to the recent
wave of behavioral economics studies. This is a big omission because “[s]ystematic market
failures and systematic redistributive problems are the bread and butter of behavioral law and
economics.” Daniela Caruso, The Baby and the Bath Water: The American Critique of European
Contract Law, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 492 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Clarkson, Constraining the Federal Trade Commission: The Case
of Occupational Regulation, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 77, 77, 81, 86 (1980).
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economy at well over a trillion dollars, a magnitude relevant to
macroeconomic distributional conversations.16
The second major question, how overcharge is distributed, has been
the subject of recent debate by antitrust scholars. Professors Jonathan
Baker, Steven Salop, Einer Elhauge and others have concluded that the
benefits of “market power accrue primarily to shareholders and the top
executives, who are wealthier on average than the median consumer.” 17
Others have come to the opposite conclusion, with Professor Daniel Crane
arguing that “wealthy shareholders and senior corporate executives do not
capture the preponderance of monopoly rents.”18 Because neither side
engages in any numerical analysis of the distributional implications, or any
systematic review of the empirics, it remains difficult to assess precisely
where each side disagrees, the scope of the disagreements, and which
disagreements matter most.19
This Article extends those distributional conversations by applying the
overcharge literature to national data on household spending and income.
That data indicates that low- and middle-income households likely pay
disproportionately more for overcharge, although there is great
heterogeneity by market and type of overcharge. In terms of income,
adjusting for many of Crane’s and other critics’ most important challenges
and relying on conservative assumptions, it is plausible that removing
overcharge would reduce the top households’ share of income from 20%
closer to 15%.20 Whether this figure supports Crane’s or Baker, Salop, and
Elhauge’s perspective is unclear since they did not express their arguments
numerically, leaving open the interpretation of words such as
16. See infra Part I.
17. See Baker & Salop, supra note 12, at 11–12; Elhauge, supra note 13, at 1293 (noting that
a large number of economists have concluded that anticompetitive pricing contributes to
economic inequality). At least two Nobel-prize winning economists have come to similar
conclusions. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 92, 97 (2012) (arguing that
corporate rents, along with corporate governance, access to health care, the tax structure, and
other areas, contribute to economic inequality); Paul Krugman, Opinion, Robots and Robber
Barons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugmanrobots-and-robber-barons.html [https://perma.cc/75H8-ZN3B] (concluding that the rise of
monopoly power may partly explain growing inequality).
18. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1171
(2016) (challenging arguments for more antitrust enforcement to address inequality); see N.
Gregory Mankiw, Defending the One Percent, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 23 (2013) (arguing that
“Stiglitz’s narrative relies more on exhortation and anecdote than on systematic evidence” that
widespread rents occur in the economy). But see Elhauge, supra note 13, at 1293–97 (providing
an extended rebuttal to Crane’s arguments).
19. Decades ago, scholars took a broader approach to estimating the distributional
implications of industry concentration across the economy. Those approaches were subsequently
economically discredited in recognition of the need for more market-specific analysis of
overcharge. See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.C.1.
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“preponderance”21 and “primarily.”22 Alternative scenarios that more
closely map the empirical literature rather than discounting it indicate that
the removal of overcharge could lower income inequality considerably
further, possibly bringing the share of income earned by the top one percent
to 10 percent of all income.
Those insights feed into the final, overarching, question in the
analysis—an institutional comparison between consumer law and tax. The
dominant paradigm generally asserts that tax law should be used to
redistribute because it distorts markets less than legal rules.23 Distortion
avoidance is less relevant to the type of consumer laws considered in this
Article which, if well-executed, remove market distortions. Several other
objections could be made about using consumer law for redistribution,
including the imprecision of the distributional effects; the possibility that
legal rules will reach too far; the difficulty in coordinating across multiple
consumer regulators; and intense political resistance to regulation. These
concerns all have merit, but taxes face execution challenges ranging from
fraud to an “illusion of precision.”24 Institutionally comparing tax law and
consumer law yields pluses and minuses on both sides, but the criterion
established as the most important one for redistribution favors consumer
law: market efficiency. There is thus a basis for concluding that achieving
as many distributional goals as possible through consumer law would be
preferable to relying solely on taxes. Stated otherwise, the failure to
implement efficiency-improving consumer law requires more inefficient
taxes to achieve a given distributional outcome.
21. Crane, supra note 18, at 1171.
22. Baker & Salop, supra note 12, at 11.
23. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 667–68(suggesting that “using legal rules to
redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax system” and arguing
that “redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income
tax system and typically is less efficient”). Scholars have begun to challenge that paradigm,
arguing that non-tax policies might work better for redistribution in certain contexts. See, e.g.,
John R. Brooks, Brian Galle, & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden
Pocketbook,
106
GEO.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2018),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3021&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/BD96-N5ZR (dark archive)] (“[C]ross-subsidies can be more efficient than
taxes, especially when they are used to redistribute wealth on grounds other than income, such as
the ACA’s transfer from men to women.”); Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a
Better Redistributive Mechanism Than the Tax System?, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 526
(2010) (“My central argument is that redistributive tort rules can be more efficient at the local
level than the national level, and may be more efficient than local or national redistributive
taxation.”); David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A
Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 75 (2014)
(arguing that other legal instruments, such as patent law, may be worthy of consideration if they
redistribute more efficiently than taxes).
24. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613
(1995).
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Part I examines how much overcharge consumers pay due to
information asymmetries, behavioral factors, monopoly power, and
restrictive government laws. It synthesizes empirical studies that mostly
estimate a percent of anticompetitive price increase in individual markets
ranging from financial products to airline tickets. Those findings are
applied to annual market-specific spending totals to come up with a base
case for aggregate overcharge across the economy. Parts II and III then
trace the flow of funds transferred by such overcharge. Part II analyzes
which consumer groups pay what percent of overcharge, by applying the
aggregate overcharge figures from Part I to spending data broken down by
income bracket. Part III then looks at income earned from that overcharge
after it enters firms. Several key inputs are determinative: how much
overcharge is profitable; how much overcharge is captured internally by
senior managers in the top one percent of earners; and which
socioeconomic groups earn ownership income from overcharge. Depending
on the assumptions for these inputs, along with the aggregate level of
overcharge from Part I, several scenarios are offered for how much of the
income of the top one percent today comes from overcharge—and thus
how the distribution of income would change if such overcharge flowing to
the top one percent were removed. Part IV compares tax and consumer law
as distributional tools, in light of widespread market inefficiency.
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